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Abstract
We propose a rich assertional language to be used for symbolic verication of systems
with several parametric dimensions. Our approach combines notions coming from dif-
ferent elds. We use Colored Petri Nets [16] to describe nets of processes carrying
structured data. We combine concepts coming from constraint programming [23] and
multiset rewriting [19] to nitely and concisely represent transitions and innite col-
lection of states of Colored Petri Nets. Finally, we incorporate these concepts in the
verication technique based on backward reachability and upward-closed sets of [1,12].
We obtain a procedure that can be used as an automatic support for attacking pa-
rameterized verication problems. We apply these ideas to verify safety properties of
a parameterized mutual exclusion algorithm. A number of open questions arise from
our preliminary experiments, nding an adequate counterpart of our framework in the
world of automated deduction being among the more interesting ones.
1 Introduction
Given a specication of a concurrent system, the challenge of parameterized veri-
cation is to verify a property for any of its possible initial congurations see (e.g.
[2,6,10,8,14]). To illustrate the problem on a practical example, let us consider
Petri Nets as abstract model of concurrent systems. Via the abstraction that
maps processes to tokens, we can describe the behaviour of our system via places
and transitions, and a possible initial conguration as an instance of a parametric
initial marking (e.g., where K  1 tokens are in a given place). The goal here is
to verify a given property for any value of the parameters in the initial marking
(e.g. for any value of K). For safety properties, the previous problem can be
1
Email: giorgio@disi.unige.it
c
2001 Published by Elsevier Science B. V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
VEPAS 2001 { G. Delzanno
solved using techniques like Karp-Miller's coverability tree [17]. Parameterized
verication problems for a wider range of concurrent systems like Lossy FIFO
Systems [1,12], Timed Petri Nets [2], Lossy Vector Addition Systems [4], Broad-
cast Protocols [11], and Coherence Protocols [8] can be solved using the theory of
well-structured systems [1,12]. This approach ts well in the general framework
of symbolic model checking with rich assertional languages proposed in [18]. An
assertional language is a formalism used to symbolically represent sets of states
(e.g. BDDs for nite-state verication) and equipped with algorithmic procedures
for the operations needed to automatically reason on the specication (e.g. to
compute preconditions). The method of [1] combines in fact backward reachabil-
ity analysis and symbolic representations of innite collection of states. One of
the more interesting feature of the `backward' approach comes from the following
observation: violations of safety properties can often be represented via upward-
closed sets of states. This is a desirable property since in several cases it allows to
give nite representations of innite set of states. For instance, an upward-closed
set of Petri Net markings can be represented via the nite collection of its minimal
points. Despite of all these nice properties, models based on Petri Nets are often
too abstract: processes here are represented as black tokens. However, in many
practical cases like mutual exclusion and security protocols processes carry along
information like identiers or time-stamps that are essential for establishing the
correctness of the whole system. When data cannot be abstracted away, we can
say that a specication becomes parametric in several dimensions (e.g. number
of processes and values of the time-stamps on each process as in [2]). Though in
the general case fully automatic verication of parameterized problems becomes
impossible, porting the backward approach to systems with several parametric
dimensions is a possible way to enrich the set of tools (e.g. automated deduc-
tion, bounded model checking, simulation, and testing) used to reason over these
complex systems.
Following this line of thoughts and taking inspiration from [2,9], in this paper
we propose an assertional language to symbolically represent innite collections
of states for systems parametric in several dimensions. For this purpose, we
found technically convenient to combine notions coming from dierent elds like
high level Petri Nets [16], constraints [23], multiset rewriting [19], and Constraint
Logic Programming [15]. In particular, the notion of constraint is central to
our construction. Following the terminology of [15], constraints can be viewed
as formulas interpreted over a xed domain, and for which one uses specialized
decision procedures, e.g., to test satisability, and entailment. More in detail,
our approach works as follows. To smoothly extend the ideas used in [1,2,8,14],
we adopt Colored Petri Nets (CPNs) [16] as our general model of parameterized
concurrent systems. Basically, CPNs are Petri Nets in which tokens can be colored
with structured data. Dierently from [16] however, our presentation of CPNs is
based on a combination of constraints with a restricted form of multiset rewriting.
As shown in [19], multiset rewriting allows one to locally specify the behaviour of
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processes in a natural way. Annotating multiset rewriting rules with constraints
allows us to nitely and concisely (e.g. without the need of axioms for arithmetic
operations) represent transition relations of CPNs.
Building upon these ideas, we will introduce the new concept of contrained
conguration as a symbolic representation of upward-closed sets of congurations
of CPNs: here constraints are used to nitely represent data attached to processes,
whose minimal distribution on the net is described via a multiset of atomic for-
mulas. Constrained congurations play the role of the minimal points used to
represent upward-closed sets of Petri Nets markings. Following [18], in order to
make an assertional language out of the previous notions, we need symbolic oper-
ations to manipulate `properties', i.e., to compute the pre-image and the union of
sets of CPNs states, and for checking containment bewteen sets of CPNs states.
In this paper we will show how to build these operations upon the operations
of the underlying constraint language. As for CLP systems [15], our assertional
language is dened for any constraint language equipped with the operations of
entailment, satisability and existential quantication. Our assertional language
can be used as `constraint system' in the verication framework of [1]. This way
we obtain a new backward reachability procedure, that represents an alternative
to `forward' techniques based on the construction of the occurrece graph of CPNs
[16]. Given the generality of the approach, the resulting procedure is not guar-
anteed to terminate. However in the same philosophy as simulation, testing, and
bounded model checking, it can be used as an automatic support for the analysis
of complex protocols. Furthermore, the procedure is robust w.r.t. the backward
approach for Petri Nets: if we abstract away the data from all components of
our assertional language, we obtain the backward reachability algorithm for Petri
Nets, whose termination is guaranteed by Dicskon's lemma [1,12]. Following [9],
we have implemented the library of symbolic operations and the backward reach-
ability procedure using a CLP system [15] equipped with a constraint solver for
linear arithmetic constraints over the reals. As a preliminary experiment, we
proved safety properties for a distributed test-and-lock protocol parameterized on
the number of processes, monitors, and resource identiers.
In our view, multiset rewriting is a possible way to connect parameterized
verication and automated deduction. In fact, at least in principle, it is possible
to express verication problems as the ones considered in the paper using AC
Rewriting and specialized theories to represent and handle colors. As we will
discuss at the end of the paper, it turns out, however, that the strategies used in
existing automated deduction tools are not well-suited to solve problems like the
one we are interested in (e.g. computing Pre

starting from and upward closed
set of states). We believe that the application of automated theorem provers to
solve parameterized verication problems, as well as nding decidable fragments
and accelerations techniques are among the more interesting future direction of
our research. In Section 2 and Section 3, we will briey recall all concepts we need
for our assertional language. The language is dened in Section 4. In Section 5
3
VEPAS 2001 { G. Delzanno
we will discuss how to incorporate the language in the backward approach, and
discuss the analysis of our case-study. In Section 6 we discuss related works and
discuss a number of open problems we plan to address in our future work. Finally,
in Section 7 we will draw some conclusions.
2 Constraints, Multiset Rewriting, and Colored Nets
Our presentation of CPNs is technically but not substantially dierent from
Jensen's denition in [16]. Let us rst introduce the notion of constraint, and
consider a restricted form of multiset (or AC) rewriting.
Constraints. Following [15], a constraint ' is a conjunction c
1
; : : : ; c
n
of atomic
formulas with free variables (implicitly existentially quantied) from a denu-
merable set V. The interpretation domain D of the constraints is xed a pri-
ori. As an example, linear arithmetic constraints are conjunctions of formulas
k
1
 x
1
+ : : : + k
n
 x
n
rel k, where k, and k
i
are an integer constants, x
i
2 V r
i : 1; : : : ; n and rel is a relational operator. An evaluation is an assignment 
which maps variables in V to values in D. The application of an evaluation  is
extended to a formula ' containing variables in V, written ('), in the natural
way. A solution for a constraint ' is an evaluation  (restricted to the variables
in ') such that (')  true (in the example hx; yi ; h2; 1i is a solution for ').
The set of solutions of a constraints is denoted as Sol('). In this paper we will
restrict our attention to constraint languages and domains equipped with decision
procedures for testing entailment and satisability. These operations are dened
as follows: ' is satisable if and only if Sol(') 6= ;; ' entails  if and only if
Sol(')  Sol( ). Furthermore, we will assume to have an algorithm for variable
elimination such that given ' and a variable x it returns a constraint 9x:' whose
solutions are obtained by projecting the solutions of ' over V ar(')nfxg. For in-
stance, let ' be x  y; x  1; y  1, then ' is satisable and entails x  1; y  1;
furthermore 9y:' is equivalent to the constraint x  1. For linear constraints, we
can use the Symplex and Fourier-Motzkin as procedures for satisability, entail-
ment, and variable elimination [23].
Multiset Rewriting. In this paper we consider the following restricted form of
rewriting. Let P be a nite set of symbols, V be a denumerable set of vari-
ables, and D be a set of values. An atomic formula p(~x) is such that p 2 P,
and ~x = hx
1
; : : : ; x
n
i is a vector of variables in V. A ground atomic formula
is obtained by substituting values D to variables. We will use j as multiset
constructor (associative and commutative),  being the empty multiset. Further-
more,  will denote the multiset union; and 	 will denote the multiset dierence
(e.g. (pjpjq) 	 (p) = (pjq)). In the rest of the paper we will use M, N , : : : to
denote multisets of atomic formulas. A multiset rewriting rule annotated with
constraints has the following form:
p
1
( ~x
1
) j : : : j p
n
( ~x
n
)  ! q
1
(~y
1
) j : : : j q
m
( ~y
m
) : ';
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where p
i
; q
j
2 P, and ' is a constraint with variables in ~x
1
; : : : ; ~x
n
; ~y
1
; : : : ; ~y
m
.
A rule M  ! M
0
: ' denotes a (possibly) innite collection of ground rules
formally dened as follows:
Inst(M !M
0
: ') = f(M)  ! (M
0
) j  2 Sol(')g:
For instance, let R be the rule p(x) j r(y)  ! t(x
0
) : x  1; y  0; x
0
= x  1,
then, e.g, p(1) j r(0)  ! t(0) 2 Inst(R). Finally, given two multisets of ground
atoms M
1
and M
2
, one step of rewriting is dened via the following relation:
M
1
)M
2
if and only if there exists a multiset of ground atomic formulas Q
s.t. M
1
= N
1
Q, M
2
= N
2
Q, and N
1
 ! N
2
2 Inst(R).
Colored Petri Nets (CPNs). Based on the previous denition, a Colored Petri Net
can be viewed as a tuple hP;Ri, where P is a set of predicates representing place
names, and R is a set of multiset rewriting rules representing transitions. In the
rest of the paper we will call conguration a multiset of ground atomic formulas.
Congurations are the `generalization' of Petri Net markings, where a token in
place p and data
~
d is represented via the atomic formula p(
~
d). Multiset rewrit-
ing rules allow us to locally model rendez-vous and internal actions of processes
(tokens), independently from the global state of the system. The constraint in a
transition denotes the relation between the the data of dierent tokens. A transi-
tion can be red only if the current conguration satises '. By construction, a
CPN implicitly denes a family of transition systems, each one obtained by xing
an initial conguration. An initialized CPN is a tuple hP;R; Ii where hP;Ri is
a CPN, and I is the set of initial congurations. The occurrence sequences (runs)
of an initialized CPN are then dened via the rewriting relation) dened in the
previous section. Let S be a set of congurations, then the immediate successor
operator is dened as
Post(S) = f M
0
j M )M
0
; M2 S g;
whereas the immediate predecessor operator Pre is dened as
Pre(S) = f M j M)M
0
; M
0
2 S g:
Finally, the reachability set is dened using the transitive closure of the Post
operator as follows O = Post

(I):
2.1 A Case-study.
We consider here a distributed test-and-lock protocol for a net with multiple re-
sources each one controlled by a monitor. Each resource is labelled with a noneg-
ative integer. A process can non-deterministically request any resource. We use
the predicates think, wait(x), and use(x) (x=resource id) to denote the current
state of processes, while a predicate m(x; t) is used to specify a monitor for the
resource x with value t for the semaphor. As constraint language, we use linear
constraints interpreted over nonegative numbers. We give the specication in two
steps. First, we specify all the initial congurations using the predicate start as
5
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follows.
start  ! start j think : true: (1)
start  ! start j m(x; t) : x  0; t = 0: (2)
start  !  : true: (3)
A run from start generates a conguration with an arbitrary number of thinking
processes, and idle monitors. As from the rule (3), start is not needed after the
initialization phase. The core of the protocol is as follows:
think  ! wait(x) : x  0: (4)
wait(x)  ! think : x  0: (5)
wait(x) j m(x; t)  ! use(x) j m(x; t
0
) : t = 0; t
0
= 1: (6)
use(x) j m(x; t)  ! think j m(x; t
0
) : t = 1; t
0
= 0: (7)
The rules work as follows: (4) a thinking process asks for a resource with identi-
er x (a nonnegative integer, chosen non-deterministically), moving to the state
wait(x); (5) waiting processes can choose to go back thinking; (6) a resource x is
assigned to a waiting process provided the semaphore of its monitor is not locked
(i.e. the monitor is idle); (7) when a process releases the resource the monitor
resets the lock. Note that in the previous specication we simply express the local
interaction between one process and one monitor (the power of multiset rewrit-
ing). The initial conguration of the protocol consists of the conguration start,
that in turn generates a congurations in which all processes are thinking, and
all monitors are idle. For instance, a possible run from start is as follows (we will
use )
i
to indicate the application of rule (i)):
start)
1
start j think )
2
start j think j m(1; 0))
1
start j think j think j m(1; 0)
)
2
start j think j thinkj m(1; 0) j m(4; 0))
3
think j thinkj m(1; 0) j m(4; 0):
Starting form the initial conguration of the previous example, a run involving
the other rules is as follows.
think j think j m(1; 0) j m(4; 0) )
4
wait(1) j think j m(1; 0) j m(4; 0)
)
6
use(1) j think j m(1; 1) j m(4; 0) )
4
use(1) j wait(1) j m(1; 1) j m(4; 0):
3 Parameterized Verication
In this paper we will restrict ourselves to consider verication of safety properties.
A safety property for a CPN with initial congurations I can be represented via
two sets S
good
and S
bad
, that represent the congurations that respectively do
and do not satisfy the property. In the forward approach to verication (in the
style of Karp and Miller [17,10,16]) one tries to prove that Post

(I)  S
good
,
whereas in the backward approach of [1,12] one tries to prove that Pre

(S
bad
) \
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I = ; (where Post

=Pre

is the transitive closure of Post=Pre). When applied
to parameterized verication, the backward approach has two advantages: (1)
computing Pre

can be done independently from the initial conguration; (2)
bad congurations often form upward-closed sets. Let us explain this intuition
using our example. The safety property of the multiple test-and-lock protocol
is that only one process per time can use a given resource; thus, S
bad
is the set
of congurations containing the minimal violations: use(n) j use(n) for some
resource-id n. To formalize the idea of `minimality' of a set, let us introduce the
following ordering between congurations:
M 4 N if and only if Occ
A
(M)  Occ
A
(N ) for any atom A;
where Occ
A
(M) is the number of occurrences of A in M (e.g. Occ
use(1)
(M) = 2
for M = use(1) j use(1) j think(2)). A set of congurations S generates its
upward closure Up(S) dened as follows:
Up(S) = fN j M 4 N ; M2 Sg:
A set S is upward-closedwhenever Up(S) = S (e.g. S
bad
in our example). Upward-
closed sets of congurations have interesting properties w.r.t. the predecessor
operator Pre of a CPN.
Proposition 3.1 Up(Pre(S))  Pre(Up(S)) for any set S of congurations.
In general the reverse implication does not hold. As a counter-example, simply
take the rule p  ! q
1
j q
2
and the singleton set S consisting of the multiset q
1
.
Then, Pre(S) = ;, whereas the multiset p belongs to Pre(Up(S)). However, the
following property holds.
Corollary 3.2 If S is upward-closed, then Up(Pre(S)) = Pre(Up(S)).
In other words, the class of upward-closed sets of congurations is closed under
the computation of the pre-image. In the following section we will try to exploit
these properties to dene assertions for verication of CPNs.
4 The Assertional Language
Following [18], a rich assertional language (in the context of automatic, or semi-
automatic verication) should allow one to symbolically represent and manipulate
properties expressed via (possibly innite) sets of states. Boolean formulas and
BDDs are classical examples from nite-state verication. In our setting we will
use constraints, this time to nitely represent minimal congurations of upward-
closed sets. For this purpose, we introduce the notion of constrained conguration
dened as
p
1
( ~x
1
) j : : : j p
n
( ~x
n
) : '
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where p
1
; : : : ; p
n
2 P, and ' is a constraint over the variables ~x
1
; : : : ; ~x
n
(free vari-
ables are implicitly existentially quantied). Given a constrained conguration
M : ' the set of its ground instances is dened as
Inst(M : ') = f(M) j  2 Sol(')g:
This denition can be extended to sets of constrained congurations with disjoint
variables (indicated as S;S
0
; : : :) in the natural way. For instance, if S
bad
is
the singleton containing use(x)juse(y) : x = y, then Inst(S
bad
) is the set of
congurations having the form use(n)juse(n) for any n. Note that Inst(S
bad
)
does not model our intuition that constrained congurations should generate all
violations. Thus, instead of taking the set of instances as `at' denotation of a
set of constrained conguration S, we choose the rich denotation:
[[S]] = Up(Inst(S)):
For instance, in our rst example we have that S
bad
= [[S
bad
]] as desired. In the rest
of this section we will show how to formulate operations on sets of congurations
at the symbolic level of constrained congurations w.r.t. the `rich' denotation
[[]]. We anticipate here that all operations will be parametric on the constraint
language used in the specication.
Pre-image computation. In order to handle our symbolic representation, we need
a new operator Pre such that [[Pre(S)]] = Pre([[S]]). We rst introduce a new
operator working on sets of congurations as follows:
Pre(S) = f AM
0
j A  ! B 2 Inst(R); M2 S; M
0
=M	B g:
Intuitively, Pre treats a congurations as `representation' of its upward-closure.
For instance, consider D = f0; 1g, and the rule p(x)  ! q(x) : true. Then,
Pre(fq(1)g) returns p(1) as well as p(0) j q(1). In fact, p(0) rewtites into q(1),
whereas p(0) j q(1) rewrites into q(0) j q(1) that belongs to the upward-closure of
q(1). The new operator satises the following property.
Proposition 4.1 Pre(Up(S))  Up(Pre(S)) for any set S of congurations.
To lift the denition of Pre to the symbolic level, we introduce the notion of
unication between constrained congurations:
(p
1
( ~x
1
) j : : : j p
n
( ~x
n
) : ') unies with (q
1
(~y
1
) j : : : j q
m
( ~y
m
) :  ) via 
if and only if: (i)m = n; (ii) there exist two permutations i
1
; : : : ; i
n
and j
1
; : : : ; j
n
of 1; : : : ; n such that p
i
k
= q
j
k
, and ~x
i
k
and ~y
j
k
are tuples of the same size for
k : 1; : : : ; n; (iii) the constraint  dened as ' ^  ^
n
k=1
~x
i
k
= ~y
i
k
is satisable
w.r.t. the domain D taken into consideration.
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The operator Pre is dened on a set S containing constrained multisets (with
disjoint variables) as follows
Pre(S) = f (AN : 9~x:) j (A  ! B :  ) 2 R; (M : ') 2 S;
M
0
4M; B
0
4 B;
(M
0
: ') unies with (B
0
:  ) via ;
N =M	M
0
;
and ~x are all variables not in ANg:
For instance, consider p(x; y)  ! q(x; y) : x  0; y = 1. Given the singleton S
with q(u; w) : u = 1; w  0, Pre(S) should contain p(x; y) : x = 1; y = 1 as well
as p(x; y) j q(u; w) : x  0; y = 1; u = 1; w  0 (e.g., p(4; 1) j q(1; 5) rewrites
into q(4; 1) j q(1; 5) 2 [[S]].) The latter constrained multiset can be obtained by
setting M
0
= B
0
=  (the empty multiset) when applying Pre to S. The new
operator enjoys the following properties
Proposition 4.2 For any CPN and any set S of constrained congurations,
Pre(Inst(S))  Inst(Pre(S)) and Inst(Pre(S))  Up(Pre(Inst(S))).
In general Inst(Pre(S))  Pre(Inst(S)) does not hold. As a counter-example,
take D = f0; 1g, the rule p(x)  ! q(x) : true, and a set S containing (q(y) : y =
0). Then, p(x) j q(y) : y = 0 (x free) is in Pre(S), while its instance p(0) j q(0)
is not in Pre(Inst(S)) (while it is in Up(Pre(Inst(S)))). From the previous
proposition, it follows however that
Theorem 4.3 [[Pre(S)]] = Pre([[S]]) for any S.
It is easy to verify that [[S
1
]] [ [[S
2
]] = [[S
1
[ S
2
]]. As a consequence of the
previous observation and of Theorem 4.3, it follows that we can use Pre in order
to symbolically compute Pre

(S) = S [ Pre(S) [ : : : (the transitive closure
of Pre). Formally, if S is the symbolic representation of the upward-closed set S
(i.e. S = [[S]]), then [[Pre

(S)]] = Pre

([[S]]).
An Eective Containment Test. To build a procedure for computing (or simply
approximating) Pre

(S), we need to dene a procedure to check the containment
of intermediate results. Specically, given two sets S and S
0
, we need to test
whether [[S]]  [[S
0
]] holds. We rst note that the previous condition cannot
be tested pointwise as shown by the following counter-example. Let S
1
be the
singleton containing the constrained conguration p(x) : x  0, and S
2
be the
set containing p(x) : x = 0 and p(x) : x  1. Let D be the set of nonnegative
integers. Clearly, [[S
1
]]  [[S
2
]] holds, however there exists no M 2 S
2
such that
[[p(x) : x  0]]  [[M]]. Though the pointwise subsumption test is not complete,
it gives us a suÆcient condition to check containment between the denotations
of sets of congurations. Furthermore, we can make it `eective' by introducing
9
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Proc Pre

(U : set of constrained congurations)
S := U; R := ;;
while S 6= ; do
remove (M : ') from S;
if there are no (N :  ) 2 R s:t: (M : ') entails (N :  ) then
add (M : ') to R and set S := S [Pre(fM : 'g);
endif ;
end while:
Fig. 1. Symbolic backward reachability for CPNs.
the following operator working on constrained congurations:
(M : ') entails (N :  ) if and only if there exists 9M
0
s.t. M
0
4M, (M
0
: ')
unies with (N :  ) via , and (9~x: ) entails  , ~x being all variables not
occurring in M
0
and N .
For instance, p(x) j q(z) : x  1; z  1 entails p(x
0
) : x
0
 0, since the constraint
9z:x  1 entails x  0 (modulo renaming, x  1 is the unier for p(x) : x  1
and p(x
0
) : x
0
 0). Then, the following proposition holds.
Theorem 4.4 Let (M : ') and (N :  ) be two constrained congurations. Sup-
pose (M : ') entails (N :  ) holds, then [[M : ']]  [[N :  ]].
Note that, the reverse implication does not hold. As a counter-example, con-
sider D as the set of terms built over a, b, and f , and the two constrained cong-
urations p(x; y) j p(z; w) : x = a; y = z; w = f(u), and p(x; w) : x = a; w = f(u)
(the denotations of the former are contained in those of the latter, while they are
not in the entail relation).
5 An Automatic Support for Parameterized Verication
Given the generality of the notion of color, most of the verication problems for
CPNs are undecidable. However as advocated in [16], automatic techniques can
still be useful as a support for their validation. Automated deduction, bounded
model checking, simulation and testing are all examples of techniques one could
use in this sense. Our assertional language can incorporated in the procedure of
[1], as shown by the program skeleton in Fig. 1. Fixing the depth of the back-
ward search, the resulting procedure be used, e.g., as an automatic support for
searching bugs. Interestingly, the procedure can be reduced to the usual back-
ward reachability algorithm for Petri Nets by abstracting away colors in the data
structures and operations. Following [9], we directly implement the operations
on constrained multisets, and the procedure of Fig. 1 in the CLP system SICStus
10
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m
1
start : true:
m
2
think j think j m(x; 0) j m(x; 0) : x  0:
m
3
use(x) j m(x; 1) j use(x) : x  0:
m
4
think j m(x; 0) j wait(x) j m(x; 0) : x  0:
m
5
wait(x) j m(x; 0) j wait(x) j m(x; 0) : x  0:
m
6
think j m(x; 0) j use(x) : x  0:
m
7
wait(y) j use(x) j use(x) : x  0; y  0:
m
8
wait(x) j m(x; 0) j use(x) : x  0:
m
9
think j use(x) j use(y) : x  0:
m
10
use(x) j use(x) : x  0:
Fig. 2. Pre

(S) with S = f use(x) j use(x) : x  0 g.
Prolog, providing symbolic manipulations of terms via unication, and contraint-
operations for dierent domains (e.g. linear constraints over reals). We used the
implementation to study safety properties for our case-study.
Analysis of the case-study. The goal is to verify mutual exclusion for any num-
ber of processes, monitors, and resources for the distributed test-and-lock pro-
tocol of Section 2, i.e., start 62 [[Pre

(S)]] where S is the singleton containing
use(x) j use(y) : x = y; x  0. On such an input, the procedure of Fig. 1
terminates in 8 steps. Counting all redundancies, the xpoint consists of 413
constrained multisets (making manual computations highly error-prone). In our
implementation we automatically remove redundant elements. The result consists
of ten elements, as shown in Fig. 2. Observing the history of the backward com-
putation, we note that start (generated in the last step) can be derived (applying
4 times Pre) from m
2
(generated in the fourth step); however m
2
represents ini-
tial congurations only if we let two monitors control the same resource. If we
assume that all monitors control distinct resources, then we can discharge m
2
and m
0
(automatically, if we apply the invariant to cut the search), and con-
clude that our protocol ensures mutual exclusion for any number of processes,
and resources. Though in the example the precondition on the monitors could
be derived by looking at the specication, the example shows that the approach
could have interesting applications to synthetized invariants for parameterized
systems. Finally, it is important to note that the previous property cannot
be proved by abstracting away data. In fact, the `abstract' unsafe congura-
tions containing the marking use j use (the abstraction of S
bad
) can always be
reached from abstractions of admissible congurations (e.g. from the abstraction
of wait(1) j wait(2) j m(1; 0) j m(2; 0)).
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6 Related Work and Open Questions
In their seminal paper [2], Abdulla and Jonsson proposed an assertional language
for Timed Petri Nets in which they use dedicated data structures to symbolically
represent markings parametric in the number of tokens and in the age associated
to tokens. In [3], Abdulla and Nylen formulate a symbolic algorithm using dier-
ence constraints to represent the state-space of Time Petri Nets. Our approach
is an attempt to generalize the ideas of [2,3] to problems and constraint systems
that do not depend strictly on time. In our opinion the combination of multiset
rewriting and constraints is an elegant way to achieve the goal.
Relation with Constraint-based Verication. Our ideas are related to previous
works connecting Constraint Logic Programming and verication [13]. In this
setting transition systems are encoded via CLP programs of the form A:-B;'
where A and B are atomic formulas used to encode the global state of a system,
and ' is a constraint modeling state updates, see e.g. [9]. Contrary, here we rene
this idea by using multiset rewriting and constraints to locally specify the update
of the global state, and the synchronization between dierent processes (i.e., we
only keep the information in A and B strictly relevant to the rule by splitting an
atomic formula into a multiset of formulas). The notion of constrained multiset
extends naturally the notion of constrained atom of [9]. However, the locality
in the representation of rules allows us to consider rich denotations (upward-
closures) instead of at ones (instances) like in [9]. This way, we can lift the
approach to the parameterized case. Concerning extensions of logic programs
with aspects of concurrency, the use of contrained formulas to dene non-ground
semantics for linear logic programs has been investigated in [5].
Relation with AC Rewriting. The use of constraints and the independence from
the initial conguration are two distinguished features of our approach compared
to applications of AC rewriting and rewrite logic to simulation and analysis (see
e.g. [21]). Backward analysis share some similarities with saturation-based pro-
cedures for rst-order logic, with associative and commutative (AC) operators:
computing Pre

here amounts to saturate the theory with the set of the logical
consequences of a theory. More precisely, we rst express a multiset rewriting
rule M ! M
0
(where M = a
1
j : : : j a
m
, and M
0
= b
1
j : : : j b
n
) as the
rewriting rule:
M j X ! M
0
j X;
where j is an AC symbol, and X is a free variable used to obtain an upward
closed set of ground rule instances. A verication problem expressible in terms
of upward-closed sets can be represented as the `reachability' problem: the initial
state, say start, reaches an instance of the term t
unsafe
having the form
t
1
j : : : j t
n
j Y;
where t
1
j : : : j t
n
denotes the minimal violations, and Y is a free variable. As an
experiment, we have encoded our example, and tested on the saturation-based
12
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theorem prover da
T
ac [22] specialized in AC theories. The prover returned a don't
know answer to our problem.
Apart from the decidability results for the verication problems of Timed Petri
Nets given in [2,3], and some results for ground AC-rewriting systems [20], we are
not aware of theoretical results concerning decidability of reachability problems
for multiset rewriting systems with `colors'. Though the notion of contraint (to
symbolically represent data) is not peculiar of systems like da
T
ac, we plan to in-
vestigate more deeply the applicability of automated deduction problems like the
one presented in this paper.
Need of Accelerations. The framework presented in the paper allows us to express
examples of mutual exclusion algorithms, with structured colors. As an example,
consider the CPN model of the well-know ticket mutual exclusion algorithm. Dif-
ferently from our previous example, the ticket algorithm deals with one common
critical section. Before entering the critical section, each process gets a ticket
and waits until its turn comes. Turns are selected by incrementing a variable
everytime a process leaves the critical section. In this example, tickets will be the
colors of our CPNs. The protocol is parametric on the number of processes and
on the values of tickets. We use the predicates fthink; wait; useg to denote the
state of processes, count to emit new tickets, and turn to establish the current
turn. Note that while we need multiset rewriting to handle processes, we should
consider only one copy of the two counters (we will discuss later this point). As
constraint language we will use linear arithmetic constraints interpreted over the
nonnegative integers. The specication is given as follows.
think(x) j count(t)  ! wait(x
0
) j count(t
0
) : x
0
= t; t
0
= t+ 1:
wait(x) j turn(s)  ! use(x) j turn(s) : x  s:
use(x) j turn(s)  ! think(x
0
) j turn(s
0
) : x
0
= x; s
0
= s+ 1:
With the rst rule, a process in state think represented as gets the current ticket
t (stored in couint(t)). A new ticket is prepared incrementing t. With the second
rule a process requesting enters the critical section whenever its ticket t has a
value less or equal than the current turn s (stored in turn(s)). With the third
rule, a process releases the resource an the current turn is updated. In the initial
state of the system all processes are thinking (the initial value of their ticket do
not matter), while turn and count must store the same initial value. values of
the identiers of the resources. The set of violations can be represented through
the constraint multiset use(x) j use(y) : x  0; y  0 denoting all congurations
with at least two processes in the critical section. Our procedure (enriched
with the use of invariants like every reachable state has at most one occurrence of
turn and count) does not terminate on this example. Furthermore, acceleration
operations built on the top of widenings used in for static analysis [7] did not
return useful approximations. Finding stronger acceleration operators seems to
be an interesting direction for future research.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we made a rst attempt to merge notions coming from dierent
research elds (constraints, rewriting, Petri Nets) in order to attack one of the
more diÆcult problem of (manual as well as automated) verication: proving
parameterized properties. Our conceptual contribution is the denition of an
assertional language for expressing properties of Colored Petri Nets. The con-
cept of constraint allows us to dene the language on the basis of the operations
(entailment, etc.) supported by any system for programming over constraints
[23]. The language is designed for the backward approach with upward-closed
sets proposed in [1]. This approach represents an alternative to previous valida-
tion techniques used for CPNs based on the construction of the occurrence graph
(forward reachability), and on structural analysis [16].
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